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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to study the eﬀects of an
acquisition in a hydro power system with temporary bottlenecks. We apply
a model with four markets: two regions and two time periods. It is shown
that an acquisition has an ambiguous eﬀect on welfare. In some instances it
would lead to larger diﬀerences in prices between diﬀerent markets, which
would lead to an increase in the dead weight loss. In other instances an
acquisition would lead to a reduction in price diﬀerences between diﬀerent
markets. This may happen if the dominant firm acquires a firm that is active
in the market where the dominant firm used to dump its production before
the acquisition took place.
1We are indebted to Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr and seminar participants at Insti-
tute for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF), the Nordic Energy
Research conference in Copenhagen November 15, 2002, and at The Research Institute
of Industrial Economics (IUI) in Stockholm November 27, 2002 for valuable comments on
an earlier draft. The research has been partly financed by Statkraft through Institute for
Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF). The views expressed here are
the authors’ own and are not necessarily shared by the Norwegian Competition Authority.
1 Introduction
During the last decade many countries have liberalized their electricity in-
dustry. There are several studies that analyse how well competition works
in such an industry.2 These studies are typically using one-period models
with increasing marginal costs. Such models are well suited to analyse a
system with thermal production. However, in several countries hydropower
has a dominant position.3 The purpose of this article is to show that the
idiosyncratic characteristics of the hydropower system may reverse some of
the existing results in the literature. In particular, we claim that recommen-
dations concerning merger policy in hydro power systems can be misguided
if one does not take into account the producers’ ability to shift production
between diﬀerent periods.
In 2001 Statkraft was prohibited by the Norwegian Competition Au-
thority (NCA) from acquiring Agder Energi.4 NCA was worried about
Statkraft’s behaviour in Southern Norway, where Statkraft’s market share
would have increased from 40 to 50 %. It might reduce production in pe-
riods when Southern Norway was already a deficit area (import capacity
fully utilised) or was about to become one, and increase production with
the same amount in later periods when there were no bottlenecks on trans-
mission lines. Then we see that the fear of strategic reshuﬄing of production
between periods was decisive for their intervention.5 The decision triggered
2Green and Newbery (1992), von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Green (1996), Newbery
(1998) and Wolfram (1999) are all studies that analyse the British electricity market, while
Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) and Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2000) are examples
of studies of the Californian electricity industry. Two recent studies of competition in the
Nordic electricity market are Hjalmarsson (1999) and Amundsen and Bergman (2000).
Scott and Read (1997), Crampes and Moreaux (2001) and Bushnell (2000) all model
a mixed system with hydropower and thermal production. None of them analyses the
eﬀects of a more concentrated industry, for example due to acquisitions. von der Fehr and
Johnsen (2002a) analyse a pure hydropower system, and they compare perfect competition
with a situation with market power. In contrast, our main focus is on the eﬀects of an
acquisition in a situation where we have imperfect competition both before and after the
acquisition.
3 In New Zealand 80% of production is from hydro, in Chile 70%, Brazil 97% and
Norway close to 100%.
4See Konkurransetilsynet (2002a). Later on the Ministry of Labour and Government
Administration permitted the acquisition, conditional on Statkraft’s sale of shares in some
other hydro power producers in Southern Norway (see Arbeids- og Adm. Dep., 2002).
5The same argument was decisive for the ban of Statkraft’s acquisition of Trondheim
Energiverk later on in 2002 (see Konkurransetilsynet, 2002b). The decision was confirmed
by the Ministry of Labour and Governmental Aﬀairs (see Arb. og Adm. Dep., 2003).
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a debate in Norway about the eﬀects of M&A’s in a hydropower system.6
As shown in Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft (2000), a power producer
might reduce production in a time period in such a way that it induces a con-
straint on the transmission line.7 It then exploits its dominant position in
the period with a bottleneck in the transmission network. However, Boren-
stein et al. (2000) applied a static model with only thermal production. It
implies that they do not take into account the fact that the production a
hydro power producer withdraws in one period to create or strenghten a
bottleneck must be sold in a later period.
To capture such an idiosyncratic characteristic of a hydro power system,
we allow for two diﬀerent regions and two diﬀerent time periods in our model.
This implies that there is a potential for four separate sub-markets. Each
hydropower producer has a total fixed energy capacity, determined by water
available in its reservoirs, and allocates its total capacity between the sub-
markets. Each producer can shift production in time by storing water in its
reservoir, and shift production in space by exporting through a transmission
line to another region.8 We focus on the case with temporary bottlenecks,
where transmission lines can be capacity constrained only in one of the two
time periods.
We can use our model to replicate the result first shown in Borenstein,
Bushnell and Stoft (2000). This is done by allowing a large hydro power
producer with production in both regions to acquire a competitive fringe
in one of the regions. After the acquisition the large producer withdraws
production in that particular region in one period to create a bottleneck on
the transmission lines, and it achieves a high price. It sells the withheld
quantity in the next period when there is no capacity constraint on the
transmission lines between the two regions, and the price reduction in that
period is limited since the market is large (regions are integrated).
But given that such an acquisition results in price diﬀerences between
6See Mathiesen, Skaar and Sørgard (2002) and von der Fehr and Johnsen (2002b).
7Schmalensee and Golub (1984) pointed at the potential problems associated with
congestion on transmission lines. Schweppe et al. (1988) develop a spot pricing theory
where the special features of electric networks are considered. Later we have seen several
studies of the problems associated with congested transmission lines, such as the pricing
of transmission and incentives for investing in transmission lines. See for example Hogan
(1992), Oren et al. (1995), Bushnell and Stoft (1996), Chao and Peck (1996) and Cardell
et al. (1997) for analysis of energy systems as networks.
8The transmission lines are owned by an independent operator, who acts as an arbitrage
player between regions and always exports to the high price region. Our approach is
consistent with the institutional setting in the Nordic market, and it is also in line with
the ”nodal pricing” system first introduced in Schweppe et al. (1988).
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markets, how would an additional acquisition influence the large producer’s
behaviour? It turns out that with price diﬀerences at the outset, an ad-
ditional acquisition might lead to a reduction in price diﬀerences between
sub-markets. The decisive factor is the producer’s location of its sales. If the
acquired firm’s sale is located in the market where the dominant producer
sells at a low price (’dumps’ some of its production), then it can be rational
for the dominant firm to act in such a way that the price diﬀerences are
reduced. By doing so it can increase the price in the ’dumping’ market and
thereby the revenues generated from the acquired firm’s sales.
In our model location of sales is interpreted as geographic location. For
example, the acquiring producer has production in both regions, and it ac-
quires a producer that has production only in the low price region. However,
the basic intuition in our model is of relevance in other situations as well.
Concerning the hydro power market, location can be given a temporal in-
terpretation. For example, one producer has multiyear reservoirs, whereas
another producer cannot store water from one year to another.9 They are
located in the same region. In a year with heavy rainfall and large amounts
of water in the reservoirs, the producer with no flexibility has to produce
in that year despite a low price. The other producer, with large flexiblity
concerning storage, can dump some of the water in the year with a low price
and store the remaining water for production the next year. After an acqu-
sition, the producer with a multiyear reservoir might dump less production
in the year with large water inflow, the year the inflexible producer has to
produce a large quantity. By doing so, the revenues from the acquired firm
will increase.
Our result can also be of relevance for other markets, for example a
market for a durable good.10 A dominant firm can find it profitable to
charge a high price to high valuation customers in the first period and a
low price to the remaining low valuation customers in the second period. If
this firm faces a competitor only in the second period, for example due to a
technological laggard, this would probably lead to an even more aggressive
pricing policy in the second period. In that case an acquisition would imply
that the dominant firm would find less price discrimination rational, since
after the acquisition it would have more sales in the second period. It would
then reshuﬄe some of its original sales from the second to the first period.
The article is organised as follows. In the next section we introduce
9This example is analysed in detail in an earlier version of the paper, see Skaar and
Sørgard (2003).
10We are grateful to one referee for this example.
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our model. In section 3 we analyse the eﬀects of acquisitions, and discuss
how asymmetries on location and the number of producers may change our
results. In section 4 we oﬀer some concluding remarks. All the proofs are
given in the Appendix.
2 The model
Let us consider a market with two diﬀerent geographical regions, called East
(E) and West (W ). In addition there are two time periods, called 1 and 2.
The combination of geography and time implies that we have four diﬀerent
sub-markets. Note that we discuss allocation of water stored in reservoirs.
A producer must then decide whether it shall produce in one season, for
example summer, or wait and rather produce in a later season. If a producer
has a one year reservoir, it can shift production between summer and winter.
A producer with multiyear reservoirs has even more flexibility, and can shift
production from one year to another.
There are four diﬀerent hydropower producers, j = S, SE , FW , FE.11
Except for producer S, each producer has plants in only one region. While
we assume that both S and SE are single producers, we interpret FW and FE
as competitive fringes. Each of them consists of a number of small producers,
behaving as price takers. FW is located in region W , while FE is located in
regionE. In principle, though, each producer can sell in all four sub-markets.
First, reservoirs enable each producer to store water and thereby allocate
its total production between the two time periods in the region where the
reservoir is located. Second, transmission lines allow each producer to sell
in the neighbouring region. The market structure is described in Figure 1.
Each hydropower plant is able to produce all the available energy at that
site in one time period (no binding constraint on eﬀect capacity). However,
total production in one region is constrained by the available energy capacity
(water in the reservoir). Then each producer has the following constraint
on production in region i:
2X
t=1
qjit 6 q
j
i , where i =W,E and j = S, SE, FW , FE (1)
qji denotes the total energy capacity available to producer j for produc-
11Later on we allow for more hydropower producers. In an earlier version of the paper
we have shown that the same mechanism will be present also in a mixed system with both
hydro power and thermal production (see Skaar and Sørgard, 2003).
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Region W Region E
Time 
period
1
2
= Shifting production through transmission lines
= Shifting production by storing in reservoirs
Producers: S, FW S, SE,  FE
Figure 1: The market structure
tion in region i while qjit denotes production by producer j in region i at
time t. All available water is used for production of energy, so that there is
no spill of water.12 Then the energy constraint in (1) holds with equality.
In line with the institutional arrangement in the Nordic market, we as-
sume that the transmission lines between regions are operated by indepen-
dent grid operators. At times of congestion the market is divided into dif-
ferent market regions where demand equals supply in each region. When
lines are congested the price diﬀerence between two regions corresponds to
the cost of transmission or the congestion rent. This rent is collected by the
grid operator.13
12Whether this assumption is realistic or not is an open question. However, it is often
used in the literature (see Johnsen, Verma and Wolfram, 1999, and Crampes and Moreaux,
2001). The Norwegian Competition Authority wrote as follows in its decision concerning
Statkraft AS’s acquisition of shares in Agder Energi (see Konkurransetilsynet, 2002a):
”The producers do not need to forsake production (i.e. let water run past turbines that
are free to be operated) in order to utilise market power. The low production costs of a
hydro power producer may mean that it is not likely that waste of water will take place,
but a producer with market power might behave in a way that increases the risk of waste.”
13We might say that the grid operator acts as a competitive arbitrage agent between
regions. If we think of the regions as market nodes, we can describe the pricing by the
term ”nodal pricing”. It refers to the term used by Schweppe et al. (1988). This pricing
regime implies that a seller located in region i will receive the market price in that region,
even if its production is exported to the neighbouring region.
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The transmission line between the regions has a capacity of K and an
actual flow of K in each period. Prices in the two regions can only diﬀer
when the capacity is fully utilized. In this case we would have that K = K.
Let Dit denote the demand in region i in period t. We can then state
the equilibrium condition for the two regions as:
DWt = qSWt + q
FW
Wt +K and DEt = q
S
Et + q
SE
Et + q
FE
Et −K (2)
If K > 0 and transmission has reached the capacity limit, we have that
electricity flows from region E to W and the price in region W can exceed
the price in region E.
We are concerned about the situations where a transmission line be-
comes a bottleneck. However, the extreme case where transmission lines
are binding in both time periods is not of interest. In such a case the two
regions are separated, and we could analyse each region in isolation. On
the other hand, nor is the case with no binding transmission constraint in
any of the two time periods of interest. In this case the two markets can
be seen as one integrated market, and the questions concerning bottlenecks
are ruled out. More interestingly, we focus on a situation where the lines
are congested in just one of the two periods. In such a case the regions are
partially integrated or, put another way, the transmission line is temporarily
congested (temporary bottlenecks).
We assume that in period 2 the regions are integrated with a common
price and no congestion on the transmission line. Even if the price is the
same in both regions we might have transmission on the line between them.
However, actual flows (K) have to be less than capacity (K). We can now
state the equilibrium condition for our new market:
DW2 +DE2 = qSW2 + q
FW
W2 +K2 + q
S
E2 + q
SE
E2 + q
FE
E2 −K (3)
Let us specify a more detailed model with the following linear inverse-
demand functions14:
pit = αit − βitDit, i = E,W ; t = 1, 2 (4)
where:
αW1 = 1, αW2 = αE1 = αE2 = V and βW1 = βW2 = 1, βE1 = βE2 = 1/b
14 In most electricity markets the short-run price elasticity of demand is close to zero.
Note, though, that short run is often interpreted as one hour. As explained above, the
two periods in our model can be interpreted as two diﬀerent seasons. Due to this it is
natural to apply a model with a positive absolute price elasticity of demand, as we do.
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If V = b = 1, demand in all four sub-markets is identical. To allow for
any possible asymmetry between sub-markets, we assume that both V and
b can diﬀer from 1. If V < 1, the willingness to pay in region W in period
1 is higher than in all the three other sub—markets. If V b > 1, the two
sub-markets in region E are of larger size than the two submarkets in region
W .
The two sub-markets in period 2 are by assumption integrated (see
above). The aggregated linear inverse-demand function for this integrated
market becomes15:
pWE2 = V −
1
1 + b(DW2 +DE2) (5)
S can now use capacity in both regions when supplying the market in
period 2. The new constraint in period 2 becomes:X
i
qSi2 6
X
i
qSi , where i = E,W (6)
In period 1, where we have the potential for two separate markets, producer
S is now able to produce all the available energy capacity within a region in
this period;
qSi1 6 qSi (7)
and still be able to sell in the same region in period 2 by the use of energy
capacity located in the other region. However, these new constraints can
not bind at the same time for positive production levels in both periods and
regions. This would result in overall production in excess of available energy
capacity. The following must therefore hold:X
i
X
t
qSit 6
X
i
qSi , where i = E,W ; t = 1, 2 (8)
Producer S can de facto move production from period 1 in region E to
period 1 in region W without using the transmission line between the two
regions in period 1. The reason is that the producer is able to reshuﬄe its
sale in period 2, when regions are integrated.
However, we still may have three diﬀerent sub-markets: region W in
period 1, region E in period 1, and the integrated market consisting of both
15One reason why the transmission lines are only congested in one of the two periods
could be that V < 1. This implies, at least as far as region W is concerned, that demand
in period 2 is lower than demand in period 1. Given the same transmission capacity in
the two periods, less transmission is needed to equate prices in period 2.
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regions in period 2. However, note that we have one competitive fringe
in region E and one in region W . Given that the competitive fringes are
suﬃciently large, they will ensure that there are no price diﬀerences between
periods 1 and 2. For example, let us consider region E. If producer SE
reduces sales in one of the two periods in order to increase the price, the
competitive fringe FE would immediately increase sales in this period, giving
producer SE no room for such strategic behavior.
3 The eﬀect of acquisitions
The starting point is, as described, that all four sub-markets are integrated.
However, there is a potential for the transmission line in period 1 to be
congested. Then we ask the question of how an acquisition may change the
equilibrium outcome. First, we let S acquire the competitive fringe FW .
Given such an acquisition, we next consider what happens when S acquires
SE.
3.1 An endogenous bottleneck?
If S acquires FW , there will no longer be any players present to guarantee
identical prices in region W in periods 1 and 2. Producer S then has three
alternatives.
One alternative is that producer S after the acquisition acts so that prices
in all four sub-markets are identical, as was the case before the acquisition.
Alternatively, producer S might reduce its production in region W in time
period 1 in order to cause the line to be congested with full imports to the
region. By doing so it could achieve a higher price in that sub-market than
in the three other integrated sub-markets. There will then be two separate
markets, as illustrated in Figure 2.
The third alternative would be to increase production in region W in
period 1, causing congestion and full exports from region W to region E.
Then there will also be two sub-markets, as illustrated in Figure 2.
If we focus on the situation where producer S finds it profitable to charge
a higher price in market W1 after the acquisition, we can now state our
proposition 1:
Proposition 1 If S acquires FW and if the profit maximation level of qSW1
is positive but low enough to cause congestion on the line between the two
regions (0 < qSW1 < 12+2bQ− (V − 1)(
1+2b
2+2b)−K), then after the acquisition
we have that pW1 − p2 > 0.
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Region W Region E
Time 
period
1
2
Figure 2: West a separate market in period 1
Proof. See Appendix A.
Our result replicates the result found in Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft
(2000). After the acquisition, the firm may find it profitable to induce a
congestion on a transmission line. By reducing production in region W in
period 1, producer S can become a de facto monopoly firm in region W in
period 1 sub-market. It controls total demand in that sub-market, deducted
the imports through the transmission line. Strategic behaviour has in such
a case led to a temporary bottleneck on transmission.16
Assuming that pW1− p2 > 0, we can find the exact price diﬀerence after
the acquisition of FW by inserting the solution to producer S’s maximation
problem (qSW1) into the two inverse demand functions,
∆p ≡ pW1 − p2 =
1
2
−(K1 + V − 1)(1 + 2b)−K + qSEE + q
FE
E
1 + 2b . (9)
3.2 Asymmetry concerning location
Let us now assume that S has acquired FW , and that this has led to the
price diﬀerence reported in (9). What will happen to this price diﬀerence
when producer S acquires producer SE?
If producer S acquires SE, it controls a larger share of the capacity
located in region E. Production by S in market 2 can now be expressed as
follows:
16 In Appendix A we also provide a numerical example that illustrates our result.
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qS2 = qSW + qSE + qSEE − q
S
W1 (10)
Producer S maximises profit subject to the following constraints;
qSW1 ≤ qSW and qS2 ≤ qSW + qSE + q
SE
E (11)
Note that producer S now has more energy available for production in mar-
ket 2. It can use some of its energy available in region W for production
in period 2, thus selling electricity in market 2. As long as production in
regionW in period 1 is positive as well, then we have an internal solution to
our problem where none of the two constraints (11) above is binding. Unless
otherwise stated, we assume that this is the case.17
From the producer’s first order condition we can define the price diﬀer-
ence between the two markets after the acquisition as
∆bp ≡ bpW1 − bp2 = 1
2
−(K + V − 1)(1 + 2b)−K + qFEE
1 + 2b . (12)
We find that the acquisition results in a reduction in the price diﬀerence:
∆p−∆bp = qSEE
2(1 + 2b) > 0. (13)
This implies that the acquisition results in higher welfare, since sales are
shifted from low valuation to high valuation consumers. The reduction in the
price diﬀerence follows directly from the change in producer S’s incentives
following the acquisition. After the acquisition producer S takes into account
revenues on sales of energy by producer SE. This energy is located in region
E and oﬀered for sale in market 2. A reduction in sales in market 2 and
thereby a higher price in that market would be beneficial simply because
producer S now controls more of the energy sold in that market.
Our result can be illustated by Figure 3, where we have shown the eﬀect
of shifting one unit of sales from one market to another. Before the acquisi-
tion the dominant firm reshuﬄes production between the two sub-markets
until there is no more to gain from reshuﬄing. When A = B + C in Figure
3 the dominant firm allocates sales between the two markets in an optimal
17Note that we rule out the possibility that the reshuﬄing of production following an
acquisition is so substantial that the price diﬀerence disappers, or that the reshuﬄing is
restricted by the production constraint. If we had allowed for such possibilities, our main
result would not change. However, the reduction in the price diﬀerence could have been
more limited than what we show, or, in the limiting case, not even changed at all.
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Figure 3: Change in profits from reshuﬄing of sales
way. However, after the acqusition it can easily be seen that such an allo-
cation is no longer optimal. Since A < B + C + D, it is now optimal for
the dominant firm to shift sales from the integrated market to the market
in region W in period 1. This results in a reduction in the price diﬀerence
between those two markets.
From the equilibrium conditions we can derive the change in profits
following an acquisition. Let πS0 denote producer S’s profit before the ac-
quisition and let πSE0 denote producer SE’s profit before the acquisition.
Furthermore, let πS1 denote the profit for producer S after acquiring pro-
ducer SE . It can be shown that:
πS1 − πS0 − π
SE
0 =
³
qSEE
´2
8(1 + 2b)(1 + b) > 0.
We see that the acquisition is always profitable. The reason is that the
outsiders cannot respond to the acquisition, since they produce the same
quantity after the acquisition as they did before the acquisition and none
of them is able to shift production between markets. After the acquisition
producer S can therefore reallocate its sales without triggering any aggres-
sive response from its rivals. It avoids the traditional outsiders’ response
problem that was first pointed out in Salant et al. (1983), and which could
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make an acquisition unprofitable.
We can summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 2 Let us assume that pW1 − p2 > 0 initially and that only S
produces in both regions. Then S acquiring SE will reduce the price diﬀerence
by q
SE
E
2(1+2b) and the acquisition will always be profitable.
Note that the change in the price diﬀerence only depends on two para-
meter values: the relative market size (region W versus region E) and the
size of the acquired producer (qSEE ). Both eﬀects are quite intuitive. The
larger the size of the acquired firm, the larger the price change following
the acquisition; the larger the size of the integrated market, the smaller the
price change following the acquisition.
Let us now extend the model by introducing more than one producer
with production in both regions. We assume that there are now n symmetric
producers in both regions. The following result can then be shown:
Proposition 3 Let us assume that pW1 − p2 > 0 initially and that there
are n producers that produce in both regions. Then producer Si acquiring
SE would reduce the price diﬀerence by
qSEE
(n+1)(1+2b) and the acquisition will
be profitable if qSEE >
(n−1+2nb)(1−v)+2b(1−v)+(2K+qFEE )(n−1)
n2−n+1 .
Proof. See Appendix B.
We see that the result concerning the change in the price diﬀerence is
identical to the one obtained in the situation referred to in Proposition 2,
except that the existence of the other producers with capacity in both re-
gions dampens the price eﬀect following an acquisition. The reason is that
the outside firms respond in a way that partly eliminates the initial price
eﬀect following an acquisition. They sell more in the sub-market where the
acquired firm sells less, and they sell less in the sub-market where the ac-
quired firm sells more. By doing so they reshuﬄe production in the opposite
direction from that of producer S, and they are free riders on the strategic
behaviour by producer S. Each of them sells more in the market where the
price increases and less in the market where the price decreases.
In contrast to the case with only one producer with capacity in both re-
gions, we see from Proposition 3 that an acquisition can now be unprofitable.
The driving force is the outsiders’ response to the acquisition. Although the
response is mixed in the sense that there is an aggressive response in one
sub-market and a soft response in another sub-market, the net eﬀect is that
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the change in the price diﬀerence the acquiring firm is trying to achieve is
partly eliminated by the outsiders’ response. The outsiders’ response hurts
the acquiring firm, as is the case in a traditional merger model like Salant
et al. (1983). In contrast to the traditional case, though, total production
is fixed in our model. Our results therefore illustrate that even when to-
tal production is fixed for each outside firm they can make the acquisition
unprofitable simply by reshuﬄing their total sales between diﬀerent markets.
The larger the capacity the acquired firm controls, the more limited scope
there will be for an disadvantageous response from outsiders. This explains
why an acquisition is profitable when the acquired firm SE is suﬃciently
large. If an acquisition is unprofitable according to our analysis, it may still
be rational to implement it. For example, one motive for the acquisition
might be exogenous cost savings.
4 Some concluding remarks
The competitive eﬀects of higher concentration are less clear-cut in hy-
dropower markets than in other markets. We show this by presenting an
example where an acquisition with no cost synergies leads to higher wel-
fare, which is not possible in a corresponding model with no reshuﬄing of
production between diﬀerent sub-markets.
Our study has important implications for the evaluation of the compet-
itive eﬀect of an acqusition or merger in a hydropower system. It suggests
that it is important to evaluate any possible asymmetries between the merg-
ing parties. Are they located in diﬀerent regions? Is one located in several
regions, and another in only one region? Do they have the same flexibility
with regard to storage of water, or could it be that one of them is able
to store water from one year to another whereas the other does not have
such an option? How are the price diﬀerences before the merger or acqui-
sition? Is the producer that a large firm acquires primarely active in a low
price market, which can be regarded as a dumping market? These and sim-
ilar questions must be answered in order to determine whether a merger or
acquisition is detrimental to welfare.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
After the acquisition of producer FW , producer S can follow three strategies
(see Section 3.1). To simplify the exposition, we let production by producer
S, denoted qSit, include production from producer FW .
If three of the four sub-markets are integrated, then the aggregated in-
verse linear demand for this integrated market (market 2) becomes:
p2 = V −
1
1 + 2b(DW2 +DE1 +DE2) (14)
Producer S is the only one that can produce in both markets, and its
production in market 2 is:
qS2 = qSW + qSE − qSW1 (15)
The production in market 2 consists of the energy capacity available in
region E and the diﬀerence between capacity in regionW and production in
the same region in period 1 (market W1). If producer S reduces production
in market W1 enough to create congestion, we know that pW1 > p2. We
can then find the level of production from producer S in sub-market W1
corresponding to separate markets, where W1 is the high price market. In
a similar manner we can find the production levels corresponding to the
integrated market case when all four sub-markets are integrated and the
case where sub-market 2 is the high price market, respectively:


pW1 > p2 if qSW1 < 12+2bQ− (V − 1)(
1+2b
2+2b)−K
pW1 = p2 if −K < qSW1 − 12+2bQ+ (V − 1)(
1+2b
2+2b) < K
pW1 < p2 if qSW1 > 12+2bQ− (V − 1)(
1+2b
2+2b) +K

 (16)
where Q = qSW +qSE+q
SE
E +q
FE
E . We can observe from (16) that the produc-
tion range (qSW1) for which we have integrated markets increases with higher
transmission capacity in place between the two sub-markets. Remember that
before S’s acquisition of FW all sub-markets are by assumption integrated
(pW1 = p2), because FW acted as a competitive fringe. We let p denote the
price of the integrated market.
After the acquisition producer S faces diﬀerent profit maximation prob-
lems depending on whether the markets are separated or not. The producer
maximizes profit by choosing production in both sub-markets subject to
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the constraints on energy production in the two markets; qSW1 ≤ qSW and
qS2 ≤ qSW+ qSE .18. When the two sub-markets are integrated producer S
receives the price p for all the available energy. Thus the profit function
(πSI) becomes:
πSI = p(qSW + qSE). (17)
In a similar manner, we can define the profit functions corresponding to
the case where production in market W1 is reduced suﬃciently to create
congestion and full import to W1 (πSM = pW1(qSW1) + p2(qS2 )) and full
export from W1 (πSL = pW1(qSW1) + p2(qS2 )). Thus we have that:


maxqSWEW1
πSM if qSW1 < 12+2bQ− (V − 1)(
1+2b
2+2b)−K
πSI if −K < qSW1 − 12+2bQ+ (V − 1)(
1+2b
2+2b) < K
maxqSW1
πSL if qSW1 > 12+2bQ− (V − 1)(
1+2b
2+2b) +K


(18)
We note that in the case of integrated markets, producer S’s profit is the
same regardless of how production is allocated between the two sub-markets.
The price p in the integrated market is determined by the total amount
of energy available, Q. Thus, producer S’s allocation of energy between
regions and periods has no eﬀect on the price as long as the sub-markets are
integrated.
Proposition 1 can be illustrated by a numerical example (see figure 4).
Let us assume that V = 1, K = ( 132), b = 0.5 and
P
ji q
j
i = 1 with qSW = 1532
and qSE = 132 . It can then be shown that πSI = 0.333 (profits if integrated
markets) and πSU = 0.336 (maximum profits if high price in region 1 in
period W . The latter case corresponds to a production level qSW1 = 0.24,
which is low enogh to ensure that pW1 − p2 > 0. In the choice between
creating an import constraint on the transmission line in period 1 and letting
18 In the situation pW1−p2 > 0, we have two possibilities. First, we may have a situation
where one (both can not bind at the same time) of these two constraints are binding before
the acquisition. If one of these constraints are binding we have a corner solution. Second,
we may have a situation where all the energy is used and none of the two constraints is
binding, implying that producer S in equilibrium sells in both markets. If we have a corner
solution before the acquisiton takes place, this will constrain producer S from behaving
diﬀerently after the acquisition. Furthermore, if one of the constraints only is binding on
the solution after the acquisition this will limit producer S’s behaviour. For the sake of
simplicity we assume internal solutions both before and after the acquisition.
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Figure 4: Profit functions for producer S under the three diﬀerent price
regimes (pW1 > p2, pW1 = p2 and pW1 < p2). Attainable profit levels as a
function of qSW1are represented by the solid line.
the markets be integrated, producer S would choose to induce congestion. If
we look at the possible range of production corresponding to pW1 − p2 < 0,
there is no production level resulting in profits that are higher than in the
integrated market case.19 After the acquistion producer S would therefore
find it profitable to reduce production in sub-market W1 which, in turn,
would lead to congestion and higher prices in this market.
19The maximum profit from inducing congestion and lower prices in sub-market W1
is even higher, πSL = 0.344. This corresponds to a production level qSW1 < 12+2bQ −K
implying that pW1 − p2 > 0. This is a contradiction, and therefore not attainable.
16
B Proof of Proposition 3
Let us assume that there are n other producers Si (where i = 1..n) with
energy capacity in both regionsW andE. Each producer Si has qSiW available
for production in region W and qSiE for production in region E. Production
in market 2 by producer Si can be expressed as; qSi2 = qS
i
W + qS
i
E − qS
i
W1.
We assume that all producers Si have the same energy capacity available in
both regions; qSiW = qSW and qS
j
E = q
SWE
E .
The transmission line between regions W and E is only constrained in
period 1, and electricity flows from region E to W with market W1 being
the high price market. We can now write our two new inverse linear demand
functions:
pW1 = 1−
X
i
qSiW1 −K (19)
p2 = V −
1
1 + 2b(n(q
S
W + qSE)−
X
i
qSiW1 + q
SE
E + q
FE
E −K) (20)
Producers SE and FE are only located with capacity in region E. The
producer Si, however, can choose how to distribute available capacity be-
tween the two markets. These suppliers simultaneously determine the level
of production in marketW1. The maximization problem of producer Si can
be expressed as:
max
qSiW1
= pW1(qS
i
W1) + p2(qS
i
2 )
subject to the constraints that apply for production in one region; qSiW1 ≤
qSiW and qS
i
2 ≤ qS
i
W + qS
i
E .
20 In order to find the equilibrium before the
acquisition we solve the n producers first order conditions simultaneously to
find the optimal values of production in market W1. Since the producers
are symmetric, we have that
P
i qS
i
W1 = nqS
i
W1. We then use these values to
calculate the pre-acquisition price diﬀerence:
∆p ≡ pW1 − p2 =
−(K + V − 1)(1 + 2b)−K + qSEE + q
FE
E
(1 + n)(1 + 2b) (21)
20With at least some production in both markets none of these constraints binds and
we have an interior solution to the problem. As mentioned before, the second constraint
is irrelevant here because with higher prices in market W1 the producer will always have
some production in this market. Here we discuss the equilibrium price diﬀerence assuming
an interior solution.
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Let producer Si gain control over producer SE ’s energy capacity in region
E. Because producer Si now controls the production capacity of producer
SE, Si can no longer be treated symmetrically with the other producers
Sj (where j = 1..n, j 6= i) having capacity in both markets. We have to
solve for optimal production by producer Si and one of the other (n − 1)
symmetric producers. Let us use the fact that
P
j qS
j
W1 = (n − 1)qS
j
W1 and
solve for the optimal values of production in market W1. By substitution
we can then write the new price diﬀerence as follows:
∆bp ≡ bpW1 − bp2 = −(K + V − 1)(1 + 2b)−K + qFEE
(1 + n)(1 + 2b) (22)
We assume this price diﬀerence to be positive also after the acquisition.
The change in price diﬀerence following the acquisition can be expressed by:
∆p−∆bp = qSEE
(1 + n)(1 + 2b) > 0 (23)
This is the condition shown in proposition 3.21
Finally, let us check the profitability of an acquisition. Let πSi0 denote
producer Si’s profit before the acquisition and πSE0 denote producer SE’s
profit before the acquisition. Furthermore, let πSi1 denote the profit for
producer Si after acquiring producer SE. The acquisition is then profitable
if πSi1 > πS
i
0 + π
SE
0 , which is true as long as:
qSEE >
(n− 1 + 2nb)(1− v) + 2b(1− v) + (2K + qFEE )(n− 1)
n2 − n+ 1
We see that the acquisition is profitable as long as SE’s production is
suﬃciently large.
21Producer Si’s incentives to increase production in market W1 may be limited by
constraints on production in region W . If producer Si before the acquisition have used all
the available capacity in region W , then the acquisition would not have any eﬀect on the
price diﬀerence. Similarly, the production constraint could constrain producer Si from
increasing production as much as wanted after the acquisition. In this case, the eﬀect on
the price diﬀerence would be lowered.
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